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Chairman: Mr. Vassallo (Vice-Chairman) ..... (Malta)

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In the absence of the Chairman, Mr. Vassallo (Malta), Vice-Chairman, took the Chair.

The meeting was called to order at 3.10 p.m.

Agenda item 86: Comprehensive review of the whole question of peacekeeping operations in all their aspects (*continued*) (A/54/670, A/54/839, A/55/138-S/2000/693, A/55/305-S/2000/809, A/55/502 and A/55/507 and Add.1)

1. **Mr. Rowe** (Sierra Leone) said that his delegation associated itself with the statement made by the representative of Jordan on behalf of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries.

2. At a time when United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, including the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), were open not just to review but to scrutiny, the report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (A/55/305-S/2000/809) or "Brahimi report" was especially timely owing to its recommendations for innovative ways and means of enhancing the Organization's capacity in that area. Recent events in Sierra Leone and the prospect of an expanded operation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo had made it even more urgent to reform United Nations peacekeeping mechanisms.

3. However, his delegation found one of the Brahimi report's recommendations problematic: the Security Council was requested to leave in draft form resolutions authorizing missions with sizeable force levels until the Secretary-General had received firm commitments in those areas. The recommendation appeared to make sense; however, it raised the question of how to proceed in critical situations, such as that of Sierra Leone, while the Secretary-General "went shopping for troops". The endangered civilian population, which the United Nations had a responsibility to protect, might have to wait for months before the Secretary-General obtained those troops and in many instances, including that of Sierra Leone, that waiting period could serve the interest of aggressors and prolong the conflict.

4. In order to solve that problem, he suggested that in complex and critical situations every effort should be made to provide a rapid reaction force contributed by individual States or groups of States in consultation with the United Nations and with the prior consent of the host country. That arrangement would in no way substitute for United Nations peace operations; rather, it would provide an important "security blanket" for countries affected by armed conflict. In the specific case of Sierra Leone, the deployment of United Kingdom troops at a critical point had provided a stabilizing influence.

5. Since UNAMSIL was still at the stage of a Security Council draft resolution, he urged support for the United Kingdom plans to send a rapid reaction force to Sierra Leone, if and when necessary, until the Secretary-General obtained troops to replace the Mission's Indian and Jordanian contingents. Furthermore, UNAMSIL contained all the elements of a complex peacekeeping operation; thus, Sierra Leone could serve as a testing ground for many of the recommendations contained in the Brahimi report.

6. His delegation welcomed many of the report's recommendations, particularly with respect to the incorporation of programmes for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants into the initial planning phases of operations, and considered that the most important recommendation was that the United Nations system should focus on conflict prevention.

7. **Mr. Osei** (Ghana) expressed support for the statement made by the delegation of Jordan on behalf of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries in relation to the item under consideration.

8. The current system under which troop-contributing countries deployed their contingents under wet-lease arrangements was not viable, because it caused considerable disparities in the situations of contingents and undermined the cohesion of missions. It also posed serious problems for countries such as Ghana which were participating in more than one mission. Such manifest disparities with regard to personnel and equipment would not be overcome until all Member States fulfilled their responsibility for peacekeeping. As the Brahimi report had stated, the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) clearly would not have faced the difficulties that had arisen had it been provided with the forces and equipment deployed in Kosovo. A mechanism must therefore be created to enable those Member States having the greatest capacity to provide equipment and personnel to join forces with those having lesser capacities.

9. Equally crucial was the provision of adequate resources for financing peacekeeping operations. His delegation urged all States, especially the developed countries, to pay their contributions without delay and unconditionally so that troop-contributing countries could be reimbursed.

10. Any peace process must include a disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme including a component to accommodate the special needs of women and children. However, as the situation in Sierra Leone had shown, poor management of such programmes could endanger the peace process and the stability of the country. Incomplete disarmament and inadequate reintegration could lead to chaos and new outbreaks of violence. To prevent that from happening in Sierra Leone, Ghana urged the international community and donors to facilitate the reintegration into civil society of former Revolutionary United Front (RUF) combatants.

11. His delegation attached importance to appropriate training of troops and civilian police to facilitate rapid deployment, and supported the recommendation of the Special Committee that minimum standards should be established in that regard. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations Training Unit had already organized a number of training courses. In October 2000, for example, Ghana had hosted a United Nations-sponsored workshop for military and police personnel of the Africa region. Given the important role of the Training Unit, the projected restructuring of the Department should provide the Unit with the staffing it badly needed.

12. His delegation welcomed the decision to create a Gender Unit and supported the appeal by the Under-Secretary-General for Member States to put forward women candidates for all components of field missions. Ghana also supported the Brahimi Panel's recommendation that the Lessons Learned Unit should be strengthened to enable it to develop guidelines and operating procedures.

13. Lastly, he commended the current arrangement under which consultations were held between the Security Council and troop-contributing countries. However, whenever the circumstances justified it, such consultations should be held at the request of the troop-contributing countries as well as that of the Security Council. That would enable many of the difficulties encountered in missions to be avoided.

14. **Mr. Krotsra** (Togo) said that, as had been made clear in Rwanda and Srebrenica, there were times when Member States did not properly fulfil their responsibility for maintaining world peace and security. That was mostly due to the lack of political will and resources and to the increasing complexity of missions. Improved operational planning was therefore needed and, to that end, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations should be reformed.

15. His delegation fully endorsed the statement made by Jordan on behalf of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, and wished to add a number of observations. Above all, peacekeeping operations should be governed by the principle of equal treatment. It was important to ensure that the same priority was given to the maintenance of peace and security in all regions of the world, particularly in Africa. Although in recent months field missions had been deployed in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia and Eritrea and Sierra Leone, and a direct and constructive dialogue had been engaged with the participants in the conflicts, the African continent clearly did not always receive the same attention from the international community as the other regions.

16. In most cases, peacekeeping missions were not deployed quickly enough, and that led to a worsening of the situation, as in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The recommendations of the Brahimi report should therefore be implemented, and the deployment of missions should be planned over a period varying between 30 and 90 days, depending on their complexity.

17. The humiliation suffered by United Nations peacekeeping forces in Sierra Leone demonstrated the need to formulate clear and convincing mandates and rules of engagement to enable troops to defend themselves appropriately. Sufficient financial resources must be allocated for that purpose; if peacekeeping forces continued to be deployed without the capacity to persuade and deter, it was highly likely that incidents like the one in Sierra Leone would happen again.

18. The international community should help to strengthen Africa's peacekeeping capacity through assistance to the Organization of African Unity and the subregional organizations. The system of United Nations standby forces could provide a way of improving peacekeeping operations in Africa, and Togo therefore supported the recommendation of the Panel

chaired by Mr. Brahimi relating to the preparation of lists of standby personnel.

19. His delegation was seriously concerned by the problem of delays in reimbursements to countries which provided troops and equipment. It was essentially due to late payment of contributions by a few countries, and was particularly detrimental to those developing countries which took part in the operations.

20. Also of concern was the under-representation of the developing countries, in particular the African ones, in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations. The necessary restructuring of the Department should bear in mind the need to rectify that situation. Africans had knowledge of the terrain which could prove very useful in defining strategies.

21. **Mr. Enkhsaikhan** (Mongolia) said that the Under-Secretary-General's introduction to the item had raised many questions that were also reflected in the Brahimi report and should be tackled without delay, such as the need for well-conceived and clearly defined peacekeeping mandates, the need for a symbolic presence and a credible military deterrent, and the fine line between peacekeeping based on a credible military deterrent and fighting a war; in that regard, his delegation associated itself with the statement made the previous day by Jordan on behalf of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries.

22. In the Millennium Declaration, the leaders of the world had underlined their resolve to make the United Nations more effective in maintaining peace and security by providing it with the necessary resources, and had asked the General Assembly to consider expeditiously the recommendations contained in the Brahimi report with a view to avoiding in future tragedies such as those that had occurred in Srebrenica, Rwanda and Sierra Leone and to strengthening the effectiveness and efficiency of peacekeeping operations. Mongolia supported most of the recommendations in that report and hoped that the General Assembly would take action in that regard during the current session.

23. His country was committed to making practical contributions to peacekeeping operations, and to that end had signed a memorandum of understanding with the United Nations, informed the Department of Peacekeeping Operations of its choice of candidates, and taken an active part in recent training exercises held in Kazakhstan for Central Asian countries.

24. **Mr. Zohar** (Israel) reiterated the statement made by his country's Ambassador to the United Nations in the General Assembly on 28 September regarding peacekeeping operations, namely that effective and predictable financial support was crucial to the success of any peace mission. His delegation supported initiatives to modify the scale of assessments so as to share the financial burdens of those operations more equitably and to introduce a 25 per cent ceiling on individual assessments. Israel had decided to forgo the 80 per cent reduction it had enjoyed and would pay its full assessment to the United Nations peacekeeping budget.

25. Apart from its financial contribution, Israel had developed a training programme in the peacekeeping field, in accordance with paragraph 10 of General Assembly resolution 46/48 of 9 December 1991.

26. His delegation wished to announce that the Israel Defence Forces would again hold their annual international liaison course at the Tel Aviv headquarters of the Israel Defence Forces Liaison and Foreign Relations Division, with a view to stimulating professional dialogue on the subject of military liaison based on the experience of the Israel Defence Forces with foreign organizations; the course was designed for officers ranked between major and lieutenant-colonel. Applications could be addressed to the Israel Defence Forces through military attachés and embassies accredited to Israel.

27. **Miss Durrant** (Jamaica) said that her delegation associated itself with the statement made by Jordan on behalf of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries.

28. United Nations peacekeeping operations had been the subject of much scrutiny and criticism. Although Jamaica agreed that there was a need to redress the structural deficiencies of peacekeeping operations, it was also aware that those operations were undergoing a paradigm shift: they had become more multidimensional, and addressed complex issues that ranged from disarmament to the rebuilding of the administrative structure of a post-conflict society, as demonstrated by the cases of the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) and the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL).

29. During the recent Millennium Summit, world leaders had committed themselves to addressing,

among other pressing needs, the effectiveness of United Nations peacekeeping operations. It was evident that United Nations peace activities could not be allowed to fail; in that context, Jamaica commended the Secretary-General for setting up the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations to undertake a review, and welcomed the Brahimi report that had resulted from that review.

30. Jamaica underscored the recommendation contained in that report regarding the need for credible, clear and realistic mission mandates, and believed that the Security Council must be more scrupulous in that regard. The mandate of a peacekeeping mission should also ensure that peacekeepers, once deployed, were capable of defending themselves and were able to carry out their mandates in a professional manner. Robust rules of engagement must be established in order to guarantee that parties to a peace agreement adhered to their commitments.

31. Her country also supported the call for consultations between troop-contributing countries and the Security Council, especially prior to the definition of a peacekeeping mandate. Prior to formulating and approving a mission, the Secretariat should have greater access to military and technical information and, in that regard, greater transparency should be sought. Jamaica continued to attach great importance to the creation of a culture of prevention. In July 2000, the Security Council, presided over by Jamaica, had reaffirmed that the United Nations must establish a comprehensive and coordinated strategy to address the root causes of conflict.

32. She was pleased to note that a gender perspective on peacekeeping, which had been overlooked in the Brahimi report, had been taken into account in the implementation plan submitted by the Secretary-General. She also welcomed the adoption on 31 October 2000 of Security Council resolution 1325 (2000) on women and peace and security and called for its full implementation in light of the need for equal and full participation by women in all efforts to maintain and promote peace and security and to increase women's role in decision-making with regard to conflict prevention and resolution. Her delegation was pleased that the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations planned to cooperate closely with the Secretary-General's Special Adviser on Gender Issues and Advancement of Women to determine measures that could be taken by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the field operations, including the proposal to establish a small gender unit in the Department.

33. Her delegation agreed that there was a need for an effective public information and communications strategy in all United Nations peace operations and therefore considered that the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Department of Public Information should cooperate to develop an effective information strategy.

34. Furthermore, in view of the complex challenges of peacekeeping, it was imperative for peacekeepers to be adequately trained and equipped for their missions at the technical level, but also with special emphasis on the promotion of cultural sensitivity to societies in conflict situations. Equally important was the need for systematic training of the civilian police since, as stressed in the Brahimi report, training for civilian police involved in operations would help to "transform a disparate group of officers into a cohesive and effective force" (A/55/305-S/2000/809, para. 121).

35. Her delegation believed that there was a need for greater cooperation between Headquarters and the missions so that they could carry out their mandates effectively; there were several key areas that could be improved, including the need for full integration with Headquarters and for better coordination of logistical efforts and arrangements for contingent-owned equipment. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations should demonstrate some flexibility in dealing with developing countries which were willing to provide troops but lacked the necessary equipment for a specific mission, thereby providing an added incentive for involvement in peacekeeping.

36. **Mr. Valdivieso** (Colombia), speaking on behalf of the States members of the Rio Group, said that, in the Millennium Declaration adopted by the General Assembly on 8 September 2000, the Heads of State and Government had reiterated their determination "to establish a just and lasting peace all over the world in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter"; the Rio Group wished to express its support for any initiative aimed at meeting that fundamental objective.

37. The Group valued the important work being done by the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations with a view to improving the efficiency of the United Nations in the maintenance of international peace and

security and had taken note with interest of the Brahimi report, submitted by the group of experts appointed by the Secretary-General, which echoed many of the recommendations made by the Special Committee in the fulfilment of its mandate.

38. The Group recognized the need to strengthen the structures and functioning of peacekeeping mechanisms in order to make them more efficient, thereby enhancing United Nations credibility in the promotion and maintenance of international peace and security in various areas. The Group recognized the importance of the elements of prevention and peace-building in the work of the Organization, based on the premise that the activities of the United Nations should respect the principles of State sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.

39. The Group was aware of the need for such reform and was concerned about the financial implications of its implementation, which should be carefully considered by the competent organs of the General Assembly.

40. The Group believed that the Brahimi report recommendations on which the Special Committee had reached agreement should be implemented by the Secretary-General as soon as possible. It was also important for the Secretary-General to submit a report on the status of implementation of the recommendations in question to the Special Committee at its February 2001 session. The Special Committee would need to consider recommendations which required further discussion, or with respect to which doubts remained, in greater detail at that session. The Group attached great importance to respect for the principles of consent of the parties, impartiality and non-use of force except in self-defence in peacekeeping operations.

41. The Millennium Declaration had reaffirmed the objectives of the United Nations in the area of development. He reiterated the Secretary-General's statement that poverty was one of the main causes of conflict. The countries members of the Rio Group hoped that, as the Organization strove to improve its operations in order to ensure peace and international security, it would also take initiatives and increase its efforts in the area of development. It was to be hoped that implementation of the proposed reforms in the service of the former objective would not be to the detriment of resources allocated to development.

42. **Mr. Kasoulides** (Cyprus) said that, as an associated State, Cyprus aligned itself with the statement made by the representative of France on behalf of the European Union.

43. Peacekeeping operations were the barometer for the Organization's effectiveness in the promotion and maintenance of international peace and security. Therefore, it was in the interest of all Member States to act on the recommendations contained in the Brahimi report. His delegation hoped that legal recourse to the International Court of Justice and other international legal bodies would increase in parallel with other methods of dispute resolution, since it firmly believed that legal recourse was the best complement to the work of the Security Council and the General Assembly.

44. Cyprus was a case that demonstrated the advantages and disadvantages of peacekeeping operations and the necessity to combine peacemaking and peace-building to avoid stagnation. In 1964, following the first Turkish attempt to interfere in Cyprus, the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) was established with an initial mandate of three months. However, following the 1974 invasion by Turkey and the forcible division of the island, the mandate of UNFICYP had been adjusted to make the Force the custodian of the ceasefire agreement, a role that it was fulfilling up to this day.

45. As the Brahimi report pointed out, "when the United Nations does send its force to withhold the peace, they must be prepared to confront the lingering forces of war and violence, with the ability and determination to defend them". Unfortunately, in the case of Cyprus, as demonstrated by the events of 1974, the Force did not have the necessary mandate and backing to prevent such a disaster. That was why his delegation firmly supported the conclusions of the Brahimi report and hoped for its speedy implementation.

46. The Brahimi report also stated that "the United Nations military units must be capable of defending themselves, other mission components and the mission's mandate. Rules of engagement should be sufficiently robust and not force United Nations contingents to cede the initiative to their attackers." That statement was illustrated with another example

from Cyprus. Only a few months previously, the Turkish occupation army had advanced its positions along the ceasefire line in the area of Strovilia, resulting in what the Secretary-General had described as a clear violation of the status quo. The inability up to this day of the Force on the ground to return the situation to the status quo ante eroded even further the credibility and image of the United Nations. As long as that effort was not based on the Security Council resolutions and intransigence and non-compliance with international law was condoned and tolerated, the problem would remain unresolved.

47. Effective peacekeeping operations must rest on a sure and stable financial footing. He reiterated the need for countries to pay their contributions promptly and without conditions attached. His Government contributed a third of the total cost of UNFICYP, which was an extremely heavy burden for the economy of Cyprus. Also, the Government voluntarily contributed an additional third more than its assessed contributions to all United Nations peacekeeping operations and it had decided to give up voluntarily the discount to which it was entitled under the present system. That issue was currently under review in the Fifth Committee.

48. **Mr. Stanczyk** (Poland) said that he endorsed the statement made by the representative of France on behalf of the European Union and associated countries.

49. While for a variety of reasons it might not be possible to implement all the recommendations contained in the Brahimi report, his delegation favoured the early implementation of those recommendations that were feasible and generally acceptable. It also supported any efforts to improve the Organization's capability to respond more rapidly to emerging conflict situations. Poland was convinced of the merit of the United Nations Standby Arrangements System (UNSAS), although further effort was required to improve that concept. In that regard, he endorsed the proposals of the Secretary-General in his report on resource requirements for implementation of the report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (A/55/507).

50. Poland, which held the current chairmanship of the Multinational United Nations Standby Forces High-Readiness Brigade (SHIRBRIG), continued to work with other participants to ensure that the Brigade became fully operational. The considerable advantages that the Brigade offered for training and coordination between national contingents were very useful in preparing troops of participating countries for playing a more effective role in peacekeeping operations. It was important to note the participation in the Brigade of developing countries from outside the European continent as members and observers. Their contribution would significantly enrich and diversify the experience, considerably enhancing the function and effectiveness of the Brigade. His delegation was encouraged by the fact that the Brahimi report recognized that the Brigade could serve as a model for enhancing the Organization's capacity for rapid deployment and effective action.

51. Regional arrangements could make substantial contributions to peacekeeping, in accordance with Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter. Therefore, cooperation between such arrangements and the United Nations should be strengthened.

52. Poland was one of the major troop contributors to United Nations peacekeeping operations. It had sent troops to the Stabilization Force (SFOR) in Bosnia and Herzegovina and to the International Security Force in Kosovo (KFOR) in Kosovo. Altogether, more than 2,300 Polish troops, military observers, civilian police and other civilian specialists had served in various peacekeeping missions. In addition, Poland had recently sent 115 police officers to the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK).

53. In addition to that effort in the field, his delegation attached importance to discharging its financial obligations in full and on time. In view of Poland's limited resources, that constituted a considerable burden. Thus, it had become increasingly urgent to reimburse countries for the cost incurred with regard to participation in peacekeeping operations in a timely manner.

54. **Mr. Jayanama** (Thailand) said that he fully agreed with the main aspects of the report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, particularly the idea that the consent of all the parties concerned, impartiality and the use of force only in self-defence were the core principles of peacekeeping. He also agreed that there was a close correlation between conflict prevention, peacekeeping and peace-building, and believed that reconciliation between warring factions should be a top priority of complex international peacekeeping operations. In addition,

peacekeeping operations must have clear and achievable mandates and sufficient resources to fulfil them successfully. Of particular importance was the recommendation on the establishment of a mechanism for consultation between troop-contributing countries and the Security Council and Secretariat from the early stages of mandates; that recommendation should be implemented without delay.

55. He regretted that countries with abundant resources generally did not contribute as much as they should to peacekeeping operations and that the troops they did contribute were not placed under United Nations command. The command of such operations should be better coordinated between the United Nations and host countries.

56. Efforts should also be made to increase popular support, both national and international, for peacekeeping operations. The United Nations should improve its public information campaigns worldwide to boost public awareness of the relevance of the Organization and, in particular, of its peacekeeping operations.

57. The report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations did not address the issues of speedy reimbursement to troop contributors or personnel safety in peacekeeping operations, both of which were very important to most developing countries. Since developing countries, time and again, had had to use their own resources to finance peacekeeping operations, a trust fund should be set up to ensure prompt reimbursement. That proposal was not unusual, as the Secretary-General had established trust funds for specific operations in the past.

58. The safety of United Nations personnel in peacekeeping operations must be enhanced. It was unrealistic and unjustified to expect troop-contributing countries to be willing to "accept the risk of casualties on behalf of the mandate", as stated in paragraph 52 of the Panel's report. Thailand therefore supported the recommendation on improving the Secretariat's capacity to gather and analyse information, which was vital for improving the decisions taken at Headquarters as to whether peacekeepers should be deployed or withdrawn.

59. Thailand endorsed the Secretary-General's observations, in his plan for implementing the Panel's recommendations (A/55/502), on the interlinkages among the enhanced capacity of peacekeeping operations, the reform of the Security Council and the scales of assessments. Success in those three areas was essential for enabling the United Nations to respond promptly to conflict situations.

60. United Nations peacekeeping operations were a temporary solution that should never become permanent or replace initiatives by the parties to a conflict. To that end, more efforts should be made to address the root causes of conflicts, and good entry and exit strategies should be devised, in line with the Panel's recommendations.

61. **Mr. Duval** (Canada) said that he welcomed the report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations. He commended the Secretary-General for having decided to appoint the Panel, thereby demonstrating a strong commitment to the improvement of peace operations. The Panel's report was consistent with many of the recommendations contained in the report of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (A/54/839). The Panel's report marked the beginning of an important process of critically evaluating the United Nations with a view to making it stronger and more effective, and provided proactive and pragmatic mechanisms for improving United Nations peacekeeping.

62. Canada supported the integrated approach taken by the Panel. The Organization's approaches to peacekeeping must better reflect the multifaceted nature of United Nations action in countries affected by war. That meant that the United Nations must become more effective in promoting the rule of law and economic recovery by better integrating the military, policing, institution-building and civil administration functions of peacekeeping operations.

63. Canada particularly welcomed the recommendations that addressed some of its long-standing concerns, such as the need for clear and achievable mandates, human and financial resources that were commensurate with those mandates and rapid deployment. In addition, in developing Security Council resolutions 1265 (1999) and 1296 (2000) on the protection of civilians, Canada had tried to ensure that, when conditions on the ground so required, mandates included provisions for the protection of the affected populations.

64. Canada had already implemented some of the initiatives called for in the Panel's report, including participation in the Standing High-Readiness Brigade

and the preparation of a list of 25 military officers available for deployment to international operations. It was also important that the United Nations should be able to deploy civilian police officers quickly to complex missions. In that regard, Canada was refining its procedures to ensure that such officers were dispatched to new peacekeeping operations as quickly as possible, and was enhancing its ability to deploy civilian experts to carry out activities in the human rights and judicial spheres.

65. One of the more challenging recommendations was the one suggesting that the Security Council should withhold final approval of a peacekeeping mandate pending confirmation of troop contributions. That issue had been a key component of the Special Committee's deliberations, and Canada believed that the Special Committee was in a position to find a solution to that serious problem.

66. In the view of his delegation, the Panel's recommendations did not take fully into account the fact that peacekeeping operations were often dispatched to countries where a humanitarian response already existed, and that interaction between those mission components was crucial. Therefore, it would work to ensure that, in implementing the Panel's recommendations, the recent reports of the Secretary-General (S/1999/957 and A/55/494) on the protection of civilians in armed conflict and the safety and security of United Nations and associated personnel, respectively, were taken into account, as they were related to the Brahimi report and complemented it.

67. Canada did not see peacekeeping and development as competing for resources, nor did it believe that peacekeeping would be detrimental to development. On the contrary, peace helped to restore stability and thus economic growth and well-being.

68. **Mr. Calovski** (The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia) said that the recommendations contained in the report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations and the Secretary-General's suggestions for their implementation had given new impetus to peacekeeping operations. It was very important, in that regard, that the Heads of State and Government had, in the Millennium Declaration, committed themselves to making the United Nations more effective in maintaining peace and security by giving it the resources and tools it needed to do so.

69. The first preventive peacekeeping mission, the United Nations Preventive Deployment Force (UNPREDEP), had been established in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. It had been praised for its success in preventing the violence in the region from spilling over to his country. In October 2000, the International Centre for Preventive Action and Conflict Resolution had been opened in Skopje as a follow-up to UNPREDEP. In a message sent to the opening ceremony of the Centre, the Secretary-General had saluted his Government's initiative and stressed the important role which the Republic of Macedonia had played in the development of United Nations experience in preventing armed conflict through its initiative to establish UNPREDEP. The Centre was the first institution dedicated exclusively to prevention, and his Government was certain that it would establish useful cooperation with the Strategic Analysis Secretariat of the Executive Committee on Peace and Security. The work of that new institution would be of the greatest importance to the efforts of the Secretary-General, and it must therefore be given adequate specialized staff.

70. While it was clear that the Security Council and the Secretariat, in particular the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, were making efforts to increase effectiveness in that area, some reforms were needed. One common characteristic of peacekeeping missions was their excessive length, which affected the credibility of the Organization. Prolonged missions were an indication of the ineffectiveness of United Nations efforts and the lack of political will on the part of Member States to resolve conflicts. The General Assembly should analyse all peacekeeping missions of over five years' duration to ascertain their future.

71. For obvious reasons, his Government was following with particular interest the evolution of the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). Although the political, economic, social and security situation remained difficult, the report of the Secretary-General seemed to indicate that the overall situation was improving. The admission of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia as a Member of the United Nations on 1 November 2000 could have a positive influence on the region, which was experiencing changes and making progress towards integration into Euro-Atlantic structures, the European Union in particular.

72. As for the recommendations of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, it was clear that they had been based on thorough knowledge of the Organization's activities in that field. It was a very positive sign that the Panel had endorsed the recommendations of the Secretary-General contained in the Millennium Report and that it supported his intention to send more fact-finding missions to areas of tension. His Government hoped that, in the future, preventive measures and peace-building would predominate over peacekeeping operations. The implementation of the Panel's recommendations would undoubtedly improve the Organization's peace activities. The important debate which had begun must not end, but should continue, and should focus on humanitarian action.

73. **Mr. Göktürk** (Turkey) said that his country was playing an increasingly important role in peacekeeping and peace-building efforts and had participated in various United Nations missions, contributing troops (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo and East Timor) and observers (East Timor, Georgia and the Iraq-Kuwait border). It had also signed a memorandum of understanding with the United Nations concerning stand-by arrangements, and had made training an integral part of its commitments to international peace. Since its inauguration in 1998, the Partnership for Peace Training Centre in Ankara had enrolled a total of 1,134 participants from 39 countries.

74. Peace-building endeavours could be successful only if they were coupled with reconstruction of the socio-economic foundations of a society after a conflict. Turkey also contributed to such activities, and had recently allocated $5 million for social, educational and cultural projects in Kosovo.

75. Peace missions originated in the Security Council. Sometimes the resolutions of the Council did not take adequately into account the nature and future dynamics of the hostilities. The resulting uncertainties made many countries reluctant to commit troops to those missions. Therefore, the members of the Council, when mandating missions, should act as if their countries would be contributing their own troops and civilian personnel. The resolutions mandating peacekeeping missions should also avoid terms and definitions that would perpetuate the dispute, and should ensure that the consent of the parties had been secured. Consultations between the Security Council and troop contributors should be interactive and allow for improvements to the text of draft resolutions. Stand-by arrangements must be strengthened, and it must be borne in mind that military contingents and their equipment were two inseparable components of the same structure. Standardizing the skills of participating units would require greater efforts in training, and Member States should be ready to offer training courses in coordination with the United Nations Secretariat. Peacekeeping and peace-building required concerted and coherent efforts by the United Nations system and regional organizations in order to project a credible force and a workable transitional structure for the population concerned. Finally, the multidimensional character taken on by peace missions demanded a restructuring that would go beyond the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, and his delegation supported the Secretary-General's decision to create the Strategic Analysis Secretariat.

76. **Mr. Thapa** (Nepal) said that his delegation associated itself with the statement made by the representative of Jordan on behalf of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries.

77. Although there had been great changes in peacekeeping operations, certain guiding principles remained immutable, such as consent of the parties, impartiality and non-use of force except in self-defence. Peacekeeping could no longer be considered in isolation but should rather be seen as one element in a continuum of responses to increasingly complex conflicts.

78. It was essential to maintain regular consultations between the Security Council and troop-contributing countries in order to facilitate the operation of the mission. Countries that had committed troops to a particular mission should have access to Secretariat briefings to the Council on matters that affected the security of their personnel. Furthermore, hasty deployment of a mission could lead to a crisis, as manifested by recent events in Sierra Leone. Therefore, planning, advance preparedness and close coordination were fundamental.

79. Although it was imperative to equip the Secretariat in a manner commensurate with its peacekeeping responsibilities, it should be stressed that resources for peacekeeping operations should not be increased at the expense of development activities.

80. The Brahimi report contained many useful recommendations that required careful study. Among

other things, it asserted that peacekeeping operations should be supported by all Member States. Unfortunately, hesitation on the part of some countries, especially those with special responsibility for maintaining global peace and security, was sending a discouraging signal to other States that might contribute troops. The current situation, in which 77 per cent of the troops deployed came from developing countries and were poorly equipped, could not continue. The requirement that troop-contributing countries send fully-equipped contingents had constrained the participation of many countries and should be reviewed. Furthermore, the delayed reimbursement relating to contingent-owned equipment had put the least developed countries at a great disadvantage.

81. Nepal had always participated in United Nations peacekeeping operations. In its nearly 40 years of involvement in such missions, Nepal had contributed approximately 40,000 peacekeepers, of whom 40 had lost their lives in such activities. Despite the losses suffered recently in East Timor and Lebanon, Nepal remained committed to continue participating in such activities.

82. **Mr. Nega** (Ethiopia) said that his delegation associated itself with the statement made by the representative of Jordan on behalf of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries.

83. United Nations peacekeeping operations should, first of all, be organized on the basis of strict respect for the principles of sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of States. Furthermore, the mandates must be clear and achievable, supported with adequate resources and designed in consultation with the parties to the conflict, the States hosting such operations and the troop-contributing countries. Administrative support and efficient management were also essential, which made it imperative to restructure the Department of Peacekeeping Operations on a priority basis to ensure that it had the necessary personnel and resources.

84. Primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security rested with the United Nations; however, regional arrangements and contributions were also important in that field. The Organization of African Unity (OAU) was actively engaged in the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts in Africa, including the conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea. In the past year the United Nations and OAU had cooperated in the maintenance of peace and security. Nevertheless, much remained to be done with regard to the application of the recommendations of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, in particular those in paragraphs 161 to 165 of its report that dealt with measures aimed at strengthening African peacekeeping capacity. Ethiopia looked forward to concrete action in that regard.

85. With regard to the United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE), he recalled that military observers had already been deployed and that preparations were being finalized for the full deployment of the mission, which would include 4,200 troops. Ethiopia thanked those Member States that had decided to participate in the mission and assured them that the Government would continue its full cooperation to ensure the success of the mission.

86. **Mr. Fils-Aimé** (Haiti) said that his delegation recognized the need for far-reaching reform of peacekeeping operations and agreed with the Secretary-General that greater attention should be given to preventive measures. Haiti therefore encouraged diplomatic initiatives that could prevent the outbreak of violence, as well as the dispatch of fact-finding missions to areas of tension. It welcomed the appeal by the Secretary-General to the Bretton Woods institutions, Governments and civil society groups to devote more attention to the connection between conflict prevention and development.

87. At the same time, Haiti stressed the need for peacekeeping operations to respect the basic principles of territorial integrity, international sovereignty and political independence, as enshrined in the United Nations Charter. Otherwise, the fears of some Member States would prove justified, in particular the smallest and most vulnerable, that they might fall victim to unilateral coercive measures imposed by a State or a regional organization in the name of humanitarian assistance.

88. It was also important to formulate clear and credible mandates. In that regard, his delegation welcomed the progress achieved in the legal field with respect to the safety of United Nations and associated personnel. Another factor essential to the success of operations was for Member States to pay their

contributions on time and without conditions so that troop-contributing countries could be reimbursed.

89. The recommendations contained in the Brahimi report were doubtless designed to establish a more dynamic, effective and reliable Department of Peacekeeping Operations. However, he wondered what the financial implications of such an ambitious programme would be. Some small developing countries were concerned that the implementation of those recommendations might threaten the continued allocation of resources to development programmes essential to them. However, well-functioning peacekeeping operations need not be detrimental to development activities since, as the Secretary-General had noted, the cost of all operations carried out in 2000 accounted for less than 0.5 per cent of the $800 billion that Member States had allocated to national defence.

90. Since the causes of conflicts were rooted in the very structure of society, the true way of achieving world peace was not through peacekeeping operations, but rather through the social and economic development of countries. Poverty was accompanied by, inter alia, discrimination on economic, ethnic or religious grounds that promoted violence. Thus, poverty eradication would work to the benefit of peace. Lastly, his Government firmly believed in the concept of a culture of peace; he stressed the importance of promoting educational programmes to eliminate racism, xenophobia and intolerance.

91. **Mr. Mutaboba** (Rwanda) said that the history of peacekeeping operations had been marked by success and failure and that a study of results led to the inevitable conclusion that an in-depth reform of those operations was needed.

92. As other delegations had stated, in order to prevent a repetition of what had occurred in Rwanda, peacekeeping operations must have clear and realistic mandates, adequate logistical services and well-trained personnel with the skills necessary to protect civilian populations and humanitarian personnel. It should also be borne in mind at the planning stage that the maintenance of global peace and security was the collective responsibility of all Member States.

93. Furthermore, in order to achieve lasting peace, United Nations operations must include a component involving disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants. The problem in that area was to determine who would be responsible for implementing that programme. His delegation hoped that the new head of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations would properly advise the Security Council and all Members of the Organization so that peace, once made, could be maintained forever.

94. **Mr. Mesdoua** (Algeria) said that he associated himself with the statement made by the representative of Jordan on behalf of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries. The Brahimi report contained a series of recommendations that deserved fuller consideration, including the proposal to reorganize the Department of Peacekeeping Operations; however, rather than creating a plethora of new structures within the Department, the available resources should be reorganized, thereby avoiding duplication and the need for increased financing.

95. Before initiating a peacekeeping operation, the United Nations must have a realistic, clear and compelling mandate and must guarantee that the parties to a conflict would respect the operation's mandate and the commitments made prior to the entry into force of a peace agreement. United Nations forces in the field must be able not only to defend themselves against potential attack, but also to defend the spirit of the mandate of peace entrusted to them and protect the civilian population from attacks by parties which did not respect international law.

96. His Government attached great importance to the human component of peacekeeping operations; the military component of those operations consisted largely of troops provided by countries of the South while the North was steadily reducing its involvement on the grounds that there was a high level of risk. That was an unacceptable situation which deprived operations, which were carried out on behalf of the international community, of significant contributions. An appeal should be made to the permanent members of the Security Council, which should play a key role in maintaining peace and security throughout the world.

97. The United Nations financial crisis had lasted too long. Peacekeeping operations were faced with major problems, including the failure to reimburse troop-contributing countries, because some countries had failed to pay their contributions; as a result, actual willingness to provide troops might be compromised.

98. A special problem that affected some countries' potential contribution to the international community's collective peacekeeping effort was that of language. He found it astonishing that inability to speak one working language should be a disqualification for servicing in a United Nations peacekeeping mission. By making knowledge of the English language an essential condition for participation in global peacekeeping, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations was violating the United Nations policy of multilingualism and might ultimately exclude from the Organization's main activity many countries in which other working languages were spoken.

The meeting rose at 6.05 p.m.